tutanota.com
idiocy at its largeOnly days before Press Freedom Day, India banned apps for secure communication because of "terrorists" use.
India first democracy to ban encrypted messaging apps on massive scale.
Only days before Press Freedom Day, India banned apps for secure communication because of "terrorists" use.
IT cell people will go out of job
The article says that at least one app (in this case Element) does have representatives and have in fact responded to communications from the Indian government in the past; if true, it would indicate that the stated reasoning may be a cover.
But, they didn't get into whether the response was complying with or refusing to a warrant. If they were complying, it actually gets funny - Imagine privacy being your app's USP & going to court against the government and say "But we gave it to you when you asked real nice!". Besides, there's no incentive for our government to ban a complying app.
But that wouldn't be the stated reason - the reason given was a lack of representation, not a lack of compliance. And if the lack of compliance is what caused the ban, then none of the other encrypted messaging apps are safe either, since being able to comply with data requests is antithetical to their intended purpose.
every party have IT Cell now daysIT cell people will go out of job
I don't think the GO even has to be so specific about it - Just some words around 'Sovereignty' & 'Integrity' is the usual. But if you're talking about stated reason from any official to media, this
is what's there in the article and sounds like it covers both.
Safe from what exactly? :
In a perfect world, yes. But it is mandated by our law.
It doesn't matter if there's a warrant or not, because a warrant doesn't influence what is mathematically possible. The entire reason these apps are used is that no third party, not even the company themselves, are able to access that data, so there is no physical way they can comply with such requests. The only way for them to do so is to include backdoors which compromise the security and privacy of the service for everyone - are you saying that that's what should be done?
I don't understand what you mean by this.
Any service that handles data is legally required to be able to gather them, when a state or central agency asks for it. The 'backdoors' don't necessarily compromise privacy or security by design. It is up to us whether or not to trust a service provider who's, again, legally required to be able to.
I'm saying,
this is how it has always been, increasingly so with every national security issue.
In short words, this article is beating a dead, non-existent horse.Only days before Press Freedom Day, India banned apps for secure communication because of "terrorists" use.
India first democracy to ban encrypted messaging apps on massive scale.
Only days before Press Freedom Day, India banned apps for secure communication because of "terrorists" use.
I'm talking about encrypted messaging. Take Signal, for example: it has end-to-end encryption, which means that the company and developers don't have access to the plaintext of the messages you send. This means that they are physically incapable of sharing that plaintext with governments.
Depends on what you mean by "data". If you mean the ciphertext, then sure, they can provide that to the government, but neither they nor the government will be able to do anything with it, unless they're aware of a viable attack vector for whichever encryption algorithm they use. If you mean the plaintext, then the only way they can comply is with backdoors, which should not be acceptable.
That is exactly what they do, by definition. The EFF - among other other NGOs and technical publications - have many articles explaining why; here's one of them for reference. You can argue that this compromise is worth it - and I would strongly disagree - but the fact that it would weaken security is inarguable.
I don't believe that "we're so far down the slippery slope that it's not worth trying to slow down" is a productive mentality.
Isn't that first video an argument against compromising E2E encryption?
Signal got subpoenaed by California.
signal.org
Signal stores encrypted messages temporarily only when the recipient is offline; Besides this edge case, messages are stored locally.
And so is this,
I'm sure every service makes a note of this legal obligation in their terms. And I thought this is what you meant by 'backdoor', my bad.
That is not what I mean.
It sounded like you were talking about the future, so I basically restated this
to add to how misleading the title is.
Yes.
I'm not here to oversimplify this into a left-right/good-bad political discussion. All I'm saying is, the current state of this is reasonable; only issue I have is this,
You seem to think that we're in the middle of a slippery slope; I think it is a reasonable adaptation that has questionable practice, which again just to stay with my point, that happened decades ago.
