about that 123 agreement

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Skilled
An intresting coulumnist article from the daily pioneer on this agreement

Source

pasting here in case the site craps out

Accepting US suzerainty

Satish Chandra

The 123 Agreement, along with the Hyde Act, will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability. It is the precursor to several moves by the UPA Government that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it into the American camp, making us a client state

While there can be no denying that in today's unipolar world India must try and cultivate close ties with the United States, equally, every patriotic Indian would expect that this endeavour should in no way jeopardise national interest or undermine national sovereignty.

With the nuclear deal on the verge of being concluded we are at a defining moment in India-US relations. The deal will not only cripple India's strategic deterrent and erode its sovereignty but will also reduce it to a client state of the US by providing the latter with requisite leverages to ensure that it never steps out of line.

No matter what gloss the UPA Government puts upon the 123 Agreement, the separation plan agreed to by it will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability as will the Hyde Act which is the framework legislation under which the 123 Agreement is to be operated. The Hyde Act, moreover, without permitting India the benefit of full civil nuclear cooperation, as envisaged in the July 18, 2005 understanding, makes US cooperation conditional on many humiliating provisions restricting the independence of Indian foreign policy and requiring a rigorous oversight of its nuclear programme, both civilian and military. The Hyde Act also provides that India remains under constant threat of termination of cooperation if in the US assessment it has not lived up to its commitments.

Despite the groundswell of opposition to the nuclear deal in the country, the Government is clearly determined to go ahead with it. It is unfortunate that towards this end it has not hesitated to engage in an information war against its own citizens by keeping the text of the 123 Agreement secret while at the same time engaging in selective briefings designed to project it in a favourable light.

The 123 Agreement is the precursor to and, indeed, the fulcrum around which the Government is actively considering several moves that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it irrevocably into the US camp. Some of these are an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), more frequent exercises with the US and allied military forces, increased US arms purchase arrangements, participation in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), active support to a US-sponsored Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), etc.

In mid July Gen Kohler, Director of the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency, and Admiral Wieringa, while in India reportedly finalised the text of an ACSA which now awaits Cabinet Committee on Security approval. It has been argued that ACSA is merely an arrangement to facilitate mutual logistic support during military exercises. This is too simplistic a projection. The fact is that ACSA provides US combatant commanders the means to acquire logistic support from our armed forces during training, exercises and military operations.

The US has concluded nearly 80 such agreements mainly with NATO and allied countries. While such agreements do not theoretically commit the host country to military action the very act of concluding them makes such countries aligned to the US and a party to its actions. Thus, our hosting, the USS Nimitz at our ports in early July while in active operation in connection with the Iraq situation makes us a party to US actions in that country.

The underlying philosophy of these agreements is to enhance the rapid deployment capability of US forces into theatres far removed from their bases. It is relevant to recall that Mr Douglas Feith, the former US Under Secretary of Defence, publicly indicated in December 2003 that the rapid deployability of US forces required that they "must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations" and that for this purpose the US was inter alia "putting in place so-called cross servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations."

India's signing of ACSA will, therefore, mark its formal entry into the US sphere of influence and signal its willingness to allow itself to be used to usher in the American century in Asia. It is ironical that this step would be undertaken by a leadership, tracing its roots to the Nehru-Gandhi family for which non-alignment was an article of faith, and by a Government relying for its survival on the Communists to whom the US is an anathema.

This craven alignment with the US even fails the test of realpolitik as the US has conferred no special benefits on India, befitting a country which it says it wants to help get great power status, such as support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, recognition as a nuclear weapon state, or even an invitation to participate in the multi-nation naval anti terror task force in the Arabian Sea of which Pakistan has long been a member.

The conclusion of ACSA will inevitably lead to an increase, both quantitative and qualitative, in India's military exercises with the US which have for sometime been on an upward spiral. This, coupled with the alacrity with which we participated in trilateral exercises in April with the US and Japan, and have agreed to the US-Japan-Australia- Singapore-India exercises, taken together with our hesitation to participate in trilateral exercises with China and Russia and our lukewarm approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will fuel suspicions that we have opted to cast our lot with the US. There is nothing per se wrong with engaging in military exercises with the US but if the scale and nature of these exercises is out of all proportion with those conducted with other countries it will naturally place in doubt our bona fide as an independent player in the region.

The grease lubricating the nuclear deal is the prospect of multi-billion-dollar contracts not just for nuclear reactors but also for arms purchases. Some of the major deals being oriented towards the US are:

$ 10 billion contract for 126 multi role combat aircraft;
$ 900 million contract for 127 helicopters for the Army Aviation Corp;
Multi-billion dollar contracts for over 200 radars;
$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for 8 to 16 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft;
$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for equipment to promote network centricity in the Armed Forces; and,
$ 2 billion contract for 400 artillery guns.
In considering the US for such massive defence orders, the Government appears to have totally discounted factors of cost, compatibility and, most important, reliability of supplies. Indeed, the US proclivity to suspend supplies at the drop of a hat on the flimsiest of excuses should have made it a non-starter for consideration for such contracts. Moreover, diversion of such orders from our traditional supplier, namely Russia, will impinge adversely on our ties with it and prompt it to find a new market in Pakistan.

It is on the cards that India will, as required under the Hyde Act, join the PSI which it has long been averse to, as well as abide by the policies of the Australia Group and the Wassenar Arrangements without enjoying the benefits of membership. Similarly, though India traditionally only favours a FMCT with an international and effective verification mechanism, under the weight of the Hyde Act, which requires it to work "actively" with the US for early conclusion of this Treaty, it is moving towards modifying its position and going along with the US which is against the Indian position and favours verification through national technical means.

Acceptance of the US position is not in the national interest as it will deprive India of a place at the high table in operationalisation of the FMCT that would, for all practical purposes, be in the hands of the US as the country with the most advanced national technical means. An early conclusion of the FMCT would also not serve India's interest as it requires time to built up adequate stocks of fissile material for its strategic deterrent.

It would be evident from the foregoing that the 123 and associated agreements, which will entail the outgo of billions of dollars, far from promoting India's emergence as a great power, will see it relegated to the status of a subsidiary state under US suzerainty. While this, of course, constitutes the mother of all follies on the part of our leadership it is also a failure of the entire political class which should have done much more to avert it.
 
kippu said:
can you summarise it into one sentence or less please?
It would be evident from the foregoing that the 123 and associated agreements, which will entail the outgo of billions of dollars, far from promoting India's emergence as a great power, will see it relegated to the status of a subsidiary state under US suzerainty. While this, of course, constitutes the mother of all follies on the part of our leadership it is also a failure of the entire political class which should have done much more to avert it.
 
i see it differently, where do we stand right now in nuclear capabilities, be in military or civil?

it has been proclaimed based on the tests at pokhran recently, but i am more or less sceptical about. IMPO it was just a flexing exercise used to put out a roar to outer world but indirectly aimed at our very own citizens to charm them away from ground realities.

Another angle is that. where are we in defense self reliance after 60 years of Independence. Stubborn beaurocracy and impotant politicians have almost cut the hands of Military craftsman and scientists.

There are a lot of examples, very promising and the best of the lot Integrated Missile Development Programme (there were 5 missiles which were projected to be developed under were Prithvi - the only properly inducted in to the forces, Agni - the most important of it but still in part deployment. TRISHUL - the antiship missile, i have not heard about it for a long long time. AKASH - the multi target anti air missile and also can be modified to air to surface missile, NAG - the most advanced of its generation anti-tank missile but its also in hibernation eversince)

The another example is MBT project named Arjun when started was promising like anything but when it came to practical implementation there were so many cost overruns and it produced only a white elephant.

The LCA -TEJAS project has shown some promise in recent days but what will happen to it is no one knows.

The only significant Development undertaken is BRAHMOS missile project which was developed some certainty due to involvement of Russian agencies.

While considering the reliabilities of parts supplies of products we purchase from USA, its not even regular now a days as Russian federation after disintegrations of USSR is still in disarray about functioning of its own defense production business. So its worth considering taking a chance.

I have not been into the details of the agreement about reducing our capabilities as a nuclear power, but with almost no progress in weapons development and dire need of clean and cost efficient source of power generation nuclear power is the best way forward for india.

Regarding taking actions against India (if some strong willpowered and good visionary politician seizes power in India and dares world with defiance to step out of agreement), which country is foolish enough to loose the market of 1 billion people strong economy and with almost no resources of its own to sustain itself, except strong knowledge power.

So even if we are taking a step back with this agreement then also because of it we may take a few definite steps ahead for sure.
 
As doc rightly said, this is a classic case of a journalist talking through his hat omitting and choosing to disregard basic facts.

Creating a hysteria is a pastime in this nation on any front. And criticizing any deal(which is possible for any deal anyway) is something everyone right from the leftists to the people in media do.

While there can be no denying that in today's unipolar world India must try and cultivate close ties with the United States, equally, every patriotic Indian would expect that this endeavour should in no way jeopardise national interest or undermine national sovereignty.

chauvinistic cry to start off an essay. Appeal to nationalism. If we are today taking decisions on which front we want to align with, its cos India is independent enough to do so. No country does thing for others interest. Today America is the dominating power and a close relation with such a country won't harm us. International diplomacy is not based on the past but on the future. You have to be alert but ready to assimilate newer ideas and begin newer relationships. Just because something worked for us in the past doesn't mean it would now. Relations with Iran are a classic case. While we maintain close ties with Iran even now, the fact is given a choice of choosing between Israel and Iran, India would choose Israel(although covertly; we can't ofcourse have the leftists crying foul and a backlash within the country over religious lines:which is completely different debate issue, so i avoid that)The fact is that Israel faces atm(forgetting the past baggage) similar situations as we do in kashmir. The history can be different(although i can argue its quite similar in both the cases) but ground reality is that both are under a terrorist threat. For us it makes better sense to be on the side of sufferers of terror rather than the ones propagating it.(a hint is good enough on who is doing that in middle east, and there is no doubting that)

No matter what gloss the UPA Government puts upon the 123 Agreement, the separation plan agreed to by it will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability as will the Hyde Act which is the framework legislation under which the 123 Agreement is to be operated. The Hyde Act, moreover, without permitting India the benefit of full civil nuclear cooperation, as envisaged in the July 18, 2005 understanding, makes US cooperation conditional on many humiliating provisions restricting the independence of Indian foreign policy and requiring a rigorous oversight of its nuclear programme, both civilian and military. The Hyde Act also provides that India remains under constant threat of termination of cooperation if in the US assessment it has not lived up to its commitments.

And what are the "humiliating conditions" so conveniently left in the air. America has to play to its own domestic market. If the condition is to stop fuel in case of Indian nuclear test, thats not a humiliating condition. You are getting into it knowing fully well what you are getting into. (It would be an aggressive step by India anyway not humiliating one) Then the perpetual doubts over whom India would side with now that the del is done. India will side with what it thinks right. Just cos we didn't go with Iran on nuclear vote, we have a debate in India over over changing foreign policy. Well so be it. It was the right move. We don't want another nuclear bomb in the middle east. We already have a situation in our hands in Pakistan and two back to back failed nations won't help our cause(the leftists have their own agenda, god knows what that is,, oh wait, they want an integration with China, the logic of that move fails to impress anyone)

Then the doubts over exercises. And whats wrong with them? We recently had an exercise with China in the south china sea too. No one really cared. With US its special. The fact is we gain out of them more so thats why we do them. If there is a threat to India in this region its China. If we are trying to build an axis against them, its certainly not a bad thing. (the whole idea of the Us, Japan, India, Australia quad was this, Australia has its own axe to grind vis a vis chaina so its backing out, it has to export raw goods to China. For people like the author of this article, an inferior India would be very good for regional security but not an India trying to build partnerships to ensure security. This is not a utopia and you plan against your enemies. China is one and we are doing what we can to take steps to beef up our defenses.

Indeed, the US proclivity to suspend supplies at the drop of a hat on the flimsiest of excuses should have made it a non-starter for consideration for such contracts. Moreover, diversion of such orders from our traditional supplier, namely Russia, will impinge adversely on our ties with it and prompt it to find a new market in Pakistan.

This is what i mean by half knowledge being dangerous. The author obviously knows nothing about the so called Russian supplies we are getting now.(Now is the main word). We received a so called battle frigate from Russia purchased for a whopping sum and when we got it, we found out it was cracked from the middle(I am not going into specifics, deliberately.). One of our defence ports spent a couple of years repairing it and its defence operationalness is highly suspect now. These things don't go out in the press and even if they do they are not highlighted as Russia is a good friend. (Which btw it is. Its been with us through thick and thin) but that doesn't mean that we can't look for better quality and be bounded by substandard supplies. If India is looking for better quality in defence armament purchases it a good thing and is being hailed by the people who use them. The author is not going to fight with the weapons. Ask those who are going to. One should be cautious but not rigid.

Anyway this is hard world. And I am not saying America is not gaining anything out of the deal. it sure is. So is India. Both lose out on something, both have to reconcile themselves over stated positions, there is a give and take. How successful we have been diplomatically is decided by an end to end balance of 50% and more gain diplomatically. The user perception in both countries of that will differ but it balances out in the end. Thats the case with this deal. Its certainly not a win win for India and its nowhere close to as bad as the author of that article has made it out to be.
 
This is what i mean by half knowledge being dangerous. The author obviously knows nothing about the so called Russian supplies we are getting now.(Now is the main word). We received a so called battle frigate from Russia purchased for a whopping sum and when we got it, we found out it was cracked from the middle(I am not going into specifics, deliberately.). One of our defence ports spent a couple of years repairing it and its defence operationalness is highly suspect now. These things don't go out in the press and even if they do they are not highlighted as Russia is a good friend. (Which btw it is. Its been with us through thick and thin) but that doesn't mean that we can't look for better quality and be bounded by substandard supplies. If India is looking for better quality in defence armament purchases it a good thing and is being hailed by the people who use them. The author is not going to fight with the weapons. Ask those who are going to. One should be cautious but not rigid.

Bofors anyone, Indian politicians are one of the most corrupt in the world, more likely is one of the power hungry ass up there in Delhi decided he wants more money. China seems more concerned being an economic giant then a defence giant atm, so not much of a threat for us. AFAIK russian defense technology is as good as the American, and much cheaper, regarding Islamic terrorism, hardly any non Islamic nation is spared in the world now.
 
How did bofors come into this. However corrupt the deal, the bofors was at the frontlines during Kargil and the decisive weapon during that war. No one is arguing about how corrupt the politicians are.

China seems more concerned being an economic giant then a defence giant atm, so not much of a threat for us

ooh oh...

AFAIK russian defense technology is as good as the American, and much cheaper

ummm

lol sorry i can't agree with both. Both are shockers :p
 
IMO, it's all about air superiority these days. In this aspect, we are nowhere. Those flying coffins are not gonna have a chance against invaders like Pak and China.
Nuclear weaponry is not something we can use just like that. We need to equip our military with decent arsenal to give them a fighting chance against our rivals. Money and research would be better spent on better small arms and instruments of conventional warfare.
 
Bofors deal was just that..to promote bofors hinduja and other got money...as simple like we paid agents to get our passport stuff first....

But i dont think it was an issue because bofors is not a mig which all lost for the country....

well the 123 stuff is more bouncer stuff for me....but its like india will be allowed to reproduce the nuclear fuel it has used.....something like that...

Btw why not we sign a deal with russia abt nuclear stuff why is it we runing for us for the same????
 
Now that the agreement has become public, the same columnist gets to grips with the small print. This time the article cites the author as a 'former Deputy National Security Adviser'. Currently as far as 123 stands, the left has voiced reservations and the BJP have been silent on the deal.

Source

123 rolls back N-arms programme

Satish Chandra

Aug 09 2007

If and when operationalised, the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement will emasculate our nuclear weapons programme. Our weapons programme will face 30 per cent and 65 per cent reduction in annual accretion of weapons grade fissile material and tritium respectively. Plus, our weapons programme will come under American scrutiny

Any realistic assessment of the 123 Agreement must note that it flows from the civil-military nuclear separation plan agreed to by India and that it will be governed by US laws, in particular, the India specific Hyde Act. The separation plan, envisaging the closure of the recently refurbished Cirus reactor and the placement of as many as 35 nuclear facilities under safeguards, including 14 of our 22 nuclear reactors, will emasculate our nuclear weapons programme.

Apart from losing the hitherto enjoyed benefits of synergy, our weapons programme will face 30 per cent and 65 per cent reduction in annual accretion of weapons grade fissile material and tritium respectively. The Hyde Act, similarly, openly aims at capping our nuclear weapons capabilities. Hence its provisions against testing and requirement that India work alongside the US for early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). It is, therefore, less than honest to argue, as is being done by the spinmasters, that the nuclear deal does not adversely affect India's nuclear weapons programme.

Protagonists of the nuclear deal have argued that since India is signatory to only the 123 Agreement, it is only bound by it and not by US laws like the Hyde Act. This is a specious argument, particularly, as Article 2.1 of the agreement expressly provides that in implementing it each party shall be governed by its "national laws, regulations, and licence requirements". It is clear, therefore, that in operationalising the agreement, the US will invoke its laws and India can avoid taking cognisance thereof only at its own peril.

The agreement, as evident from Articles 2.2d and 5.2, contemplates less than full civil nuclear cooperation. Cooperation is debarred in the areas of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water plants. Article 5.2, of course, leaves open the possibility of cooperation in these areas "pursuant to an amendment" to the agreement. Given the firm position in the Hyde Act against cooperation in these areas, such an amendment stands no chance of success and this provision serves no purpose other than that of optics.

The agreement is liberally plastered with assertions to the effect that the US would seek to amend its laws and work with friends to obtain for India "reliable, uninterrupted and continual access" to nuclear fuel supplies as well as support an Indian effort to develop a strategic fuel reserve. Regrettably, these assertions have not been translated into a legally binding arrangement, providing India with assured fuel supplies during the lifetime of its civil nuclear reactors. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Dr A Gopalakrishnan, the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, has pointed out, the prospects of an amendment to US law on this issue is "highly remote", because during discussions on the Hyde Act, the US Congress not only rejected the idea of fuel assurances but went on to stipulate that the US would "seek to prevent" fuel transfers from other sources in the event of suspension of cooperation.

Under the Hyde Act all that the US can provide India at a time is at best two to three years of reactor operating supplies. In these circumstances, India's commitment, vide Article 5.6c, to place its civil nuclear facilities under in perpetuity safeguards does not reflect well on our negotiators. They have traded a legally binding commitment for in perpetuity safeguards, against highly dubious assertions of good intent about trying to obtain assured lifetime fuel supplies for India that are neither legally enforceable nor likely to yield the desired result.

Much has been made by the Government of the right to reprocess, conceded under Article 6iii of the agreement. This is, however, contingent upon India first building a dedicated IAEA safeguarded national reprocessing facility for this purpose and, thereafter, working out with the US the modalities and arrangements for such reprocessing. As Under Secretary Burns has subsequently clarified, this would need a fresh agreement as well as Congressional approval. Accordingly, the "success" of our negotiators in wresting the right to reprocess from the US loses much of its sheen, as we will be able to actually exercise it only several years hence, and that too after having gone to great expense in constructing a new facility. Moreover, the US, vide Article 14.9, can suspend this right "in exceptional circumstances".

The agreement clearly envisages fallback safeguards, end use inspections, and in perpetuity safeguards even after its termination, vide Articles 10.4, 12.3 and 16.3 respectively. To add insult to injury, the agreement, vide Article 10.5, requires India "to maintain and facilitate" application of IAEA safeguards. It is, therefore, on the cards that India would have to host and pay for a large IAEA inspectorate based in New Delhi.

Whereas under the US Atomic Energy Act, the right of return can only be invoked for breach of IAEA safeguards and for testing, under Article 14.4 of the agreement, the US can exercise right of return even when there is cessation of cooperation. Moreover, under Article 14.2, notwithstanding all the much-trumpeted layered consultation procedures built into the agreement, cessation of cooperation can be instantaneous, following notice of termination. Termination of the agreement can also be for reasons other than its violation, lending further credence to the view that if India runs afoul of the Hyde Act, the US could cite it as reason for termination.

It is clear from the foregoing that the agreement in no way insulates India from the malign impact of the Hyde Act. It is, therefore, no surprise that Under Secretary Burns has termed as "absolutely false" the contention that the US would help India find other sources of fuel if it tests, and asserted that it would invoke the right of return in the event of an Indian nuclear test.

The deficiencies in the agreement are amply reflected in the fact that it does not meet the concerns voiced by the Prime Minister in Parliament on August 17, 2006. The agreement neither secures full civil nuclear cooperation for India nor ensures the "irreversible removal of restrictions" on civil nuclear cooperation. It fails to ensure lifetime supplies of nuclear fuel for our reactors and in no way mitigates US legislation making civil nuclear cooperation conditional on our foregoing our right to test.

It does not eliminate the Hyde Act mandated scrutiny of India's nuclear weapons programme, annual Presidential assessments of India's good behaviour and fall back safeguards or end use inspections which will lead to US officials roaming about our nuclear facilities. It also does nothing to attenuate the innumerable conditionalities imposed by the Hyde Act on India on issues like Iran, the FMCT, the PSI etc which impinge on India's foreign policy independence.

It is ironical that while, on the one hand, the nuclear deal is being justified, albeit quite dubiously, on grounds that it is essential for our economic well being, on the other hand, in concretising it all norms of fiscal prudence have been jettisoned. No thought appears to have, for instance, been given to the cost of separation. Indeed, so far-reaching a decision should only have been made following a detailed cost benefit analysis and the results should have been shared with the nation.

Similarly, in its anxiety to somehow quickly tie up the nuclear deal, the Government has shown no hesitation in committing the nation to huge expenditures which would have to be incurred for building a strategic nuclear fuel reserve, and constructing a new state-of-the-art reprocessing facility, not to speak of payments for in perpetuity IAEA inspections.

The writer is former Deputy National Security Adviser.
 
only the "present national security advisor" has said he is fine with it and so are the scientists at BARC.

Left being angry is expected. Bjp will make a show for political reasons as they want the credit. They will vote for the bill. About the article, will reply if i get time later ;)
 
Keep them coming :)

..this is a rather important agreement with consequences for the future.

Way i see it upto now...

to get something... you (may) have to give up something else.

So..since we are on the upswing, close to dbl digit growth for what appears to be a decade. How to keep it going ?

Adding more energy capability is one way to do it. Tho getting this from the US, that is < 20% nuclear is curious, surely the French would be better qualified in this area as they are nearly 80% nuclear. So its clear its more than just the nuclear tech here. The push from Washington, lots of lobbying there to sell $Billion contracts etc. But does it come with a catch ?

The current administration says the catch is not as bad as the opposition parties make it out to be. Might it be a tad naive to think that the concerned parties could let go of partisanship and keep the future interest of the country in mind instead :)

But there is also opposition abroad to make concessions to just one unique country that may or may not qualify in their eyes for such treatment as it sets a precedent for others to make the NPT less binding than it currently is...inspite of us not even being a signatory. Maybe they would have been happier if we *did* finally sign the NPT but i don't think that will happen.

So..it would seem in the interest of the US to show the doubters that they have in some ways limited or contained the current & future defense nuclear capabilities of this country. So 123 becomes an easier sell, see..yes, they are unique but this agreement lays out a framework to keep them honest, since they won't sign the NPT, but this is the next best option.

There is also a niggling thought that this will in effect push India closer to whatever strategic designs the US has for this region. It in a way gives us less independance in the future when it comes to dealing with world issues as we are now closer to the US camp. Then again there is nothing stopping us doing additional deals with the Russians or the French so the US does not become the sole supplier here but they get first shot to sell to India.

But there is the NSG that they belong to and in the end, the US has final say as to whether a country gets fuel or not. The reactors being built, i doubt would be able to take advantage of the existing Thorium we have and would instead use whatever fuel tech is being sold.

SO, the real question is..

is it worth sustaining (even increasing) the current growth we have with the cooperation that will surely follow, if this agreement finally comes to pass,

...in exchange for future constraints that may arise ?

The small print is always what gets you in the end.
 
Another article to shed more light on this agreement, put it terms we lay people can hopefully understand.

Source

Trick or treat

Pratap Bhanu Mehta

Posted online: Tuesday, August 07, 2007 at 0000 hrs IST
Whether or not one endorses the 123 Agreement, it is something of a credit to the artfulness of India’s negotiators. But its ambiguities suggest that it is not the agreement itself, but its subsequent circumstances and interpretations that will determine how good it is for India. Critics of the deal should acknowledge that it could turn out to be greatly beneficial; but equally supporters of the deal should acknowledge the ways in which it could act as a serious fetter. Instead of focusing on the text, it is more useful to think about the conditions under which it will work to our advantage. The agreement’s soundness depends on your estimate of these conditions obtaining; as it also depends upon the still unresolved question of what our larger strategic doctrine is.

Thomas Jefferson once argued, “On the subject of treaties, our system is to have none with any nation as far as can be avoided. We believe that with nations as with individuals, dealings may be carried out advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance depends on a voluntary good treatment as if fixed by contract which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made by forced constructions to mean what suits them and becomes a cause of war instead a bond of peace.” Jefferson was wrong about avoiding treaties. But he was right that circumstances determine how injurious they are, and that dominant powers will put forced constructions upon them when it suits them. The US has a record of negating important treaties like the ABM when it chooses. It would be height of folly if we did not acknowledge that the benign constructions of the 123 Agreement will depend upon our keeping in America’s good books.

Assuming the treaty goes through, its advantages or disadvantages will not be determined by the text itself. It will depend rather on complex sets of negotiations. There is still a constitutive ambiguity around how much strategic fuel reserve India will be able to build. While the agreement suggests the possibility of building up a considerable reserve, the Hyde Act conference report explicitly suggests that the “United States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed as a result of India’s nuclear tests”. But whether this issue becomes an occasion for constructive fudging in India’s favour, or the creation of a possible vulnerability, will depend on two things. First, future developments in the political equations between India and the US. Second, the character of the actual contracts we give out for specific nuclear plants will have considerable bearing on the nature of fuel supplies we get. It is possible to use those contracts to secure more or less assurance in fuel supplies or at least ensure that others, not us, bear the risks of termination. A lot will depend on our tough-mindedness in leveraging that possibility.

There is a lesson we must learn from the Chinese. They enter into agreements only when they have done all the homework to leverage their domestic resources so that they can negotiate from a position of strength. Over the last decade we failed to use all available domestic resources to gain a position of strength. How much we are in a position to bargain to our advantage will depend not so much on the deal but on what we do with our resources. Arguably the separation allows an opportunity for accountability of our systems. More than the constraints imposed by the agreement, the critical variable is: can we get our domestic supplies and indigenous capabilities in order as insurance? This is connected to the third question: testing. Under the present agreement we are not any worse off than the status quo. Whether we test depends upon our capacity to internalise the costs consequent upon testing, a formal right is a non sequitur. Some fear that having made investments in nuclear plants will raise the costs of potential future testing. But this is far from clear; if we have intelligent, systematic plans it could raise the cost of imposing sanctions.

Fundamentally our future will depend on how we strategise; this agreement alone will neither make it nor break it. But it does require us to be prepared for hard-headed negotiations and contracts and not look for assurances or threats in parchment texts.

The same applies to the crucial clause in the agreement that is open-ended: the right of termination. Euphemisms about consultation and grave consequences of termination are neither here nor there. Underlying is a fundamental question. When can we be confident that the US will not impose it to our disadvantage? Either we have powerful enough lobbies in the US, which many think we are now in a position to create. The business of US foreign policy is business: their incentive becomes our leverage. But it would be foolish to overestimate this. For fundamentally, how the agreement gets interpreted will depend on how much in line we fall with the US’s overall perspective of the world. This is where the greatest danger might lie. There is reason to think that we are beginning to define the world as the US does.

For instance, flirting with the idea of a concert of democracies as an organising principle in international affairs is dangerous. It is nothing but a contrivance designed to humiliate Russia, China and Iran. The Missile Defence Initiative is nothing but a catalyst for another arms race. Outside of the historically exceptional circumstances of Germany and Japan, US intervention has been catastrophic for so many societies, and even with a change in administration it is not clear that this policy will recover from its ruinous path. In short, it is not in our interests to act as if we have a strategic congruence with the US. Especially, if the deal goes through, we will have to work harder to maintain our independence or Jefferson’s “forced constructions” will be upon us. In India there is a bizarre Dulles-inspired dichotomy: either you are with America or against it. But the more sensible position is to recognise that America is a wonderful society but can be a dangerous state.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research
 
Regarding domestic politics, yossarin has this to say

The politics over 123 is hardly about maturity or strategy. The politics is about this cold reality.

There are no votes in concluding a successful agreement with the United States. The average Indian Voter is neutral on this issue.

On the other hand there are some votes in opposing a succesful agreement with the United States as it panders to a fringe minority on both the Left as well as the Right. The fringe left, still stuck with an anti-imperialist mindset, derives satisfaction by taking anti-US positions every so often. The fringe Right on the other hand still stuck with a xenophonic mindset is typically suspicious of anything American.

There are an awful lot of votes in successfuly oppposing an agreement with the United States and killing it by making it out to be a sell-out of national interests, sensitivity to Muslims (Iran issue) etc.. The minority vote bank can get energized at the drop of a hat on an Anti-American platform. Sections of the middle class too can get carried away by jingoistic rhetoric in the wake of a dead deal.

Read the rest here
 
If we keep electing people who were born as British chamchas we will continue to be the slave minded society that we presently are. No ones investing money in the domestic arms manufacturing sector and they keep buying third grade, export oriented stuff from abroad.

Even our armed forces are in awe of these"gora" toys...
 
No ones investing money in the domestic arms manufacturing sector and they keep buying third grade, export oriented stuff from abroad.

Read below and you might get the answer, it certainly helped explain why a Japanese Bank loaned half the upfront cost for the Bangalore Metro project.

Source

Bharat versus Karat

Ashok Malik

Aug 14 2007

The Communist parties' attack on the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement and India's relationship with America is actually a positioning exercise for the 2009 general election

Despite occasional recourse to the draft of the 123 Agreement, it is increasingly clear the Left Front is not objecting to the India-US nuclear deal as much as to the philosophy underpinning it, and to its strategic potential. After all, the Communists have never quite been votaries of an Indian Bomb and to have them shed tears for possible challenges to the military nuclear programme is downright strange.

Three elements to the political drama that has followed the 123 Agreement need to be analysed. Indeed, they need to be rescued from the alarmism and rhetoric that the Left, true to form, is resorting to. In the process it is hijacking the debate, seeking to set the terms of discourse and adopting, as usual, a bogus high ground.

The first conspiracy theory concerns the Indian freedom to test a nuclear device in the future, or at least for the 40 years of the agreement's life. As Mr Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Adviser, pointed out in a recent television interview, the deal does not prohibit India from testing but does increase the cost of testing.

Actually, Mr Mishra's observation is a bit of a truism, irrespective of whether the 123 Agreement was reached or not. There are a host of reasons for this. India's economic engagement with the world has in any case restricted its operational autonomy to detonate a nuclear device just because it feels like, or acts in a manner others construe as adventurism.

In 2002, the India-Pakistani mobilisation on the international border persuaded at least one major American IT/BPO company to defer investment in Rajasthan. The logic was that an outsourcing facility in a border State was a risky venture. It could have been argued that Delhi and Gurgaon are about as far from Pakistan as Jaipur, but the fact is the MNC's executives stuck by their decision.

As such the opportunity costs of a nuclear test without an immediate provocation will be far higher today than they were in 1974 or 1998. That situation will not change even if the Government bows to Mr Prakash Karat and tears up the 123 Agreement.

That aside, at least in the foreseeable future, a nuclear test is not going to make as much of a domestic political statement as it did in 1974 or the 1990s. The geopolitical factors have changed, nobody is pushing India to sign unequal international treaties such as CTBT. As such, there is no nationalist resentment brewing. Quite simply, India has moved on.

The second scare theory the Left has pulled out of its hat is that India is being forced to join a coalition against China. The reference is to the so-called 'Quadrilateral' of Asia-Pacific democracies - India, Australia, Japan and the US. The sight of Mr Karat and Mr AB Bardhan leading jathas down India's east coast, flailing their arms against joint exercises by the navies of the Quadrilateral countries and Singapore, may appear appealing or even entertaining. It represents, however, a gross oversimplification of diplomacy.

The Quadrilateral is an idea for the 21st century; it is the fall-back option for its partners should China spin into a rogue orbit. Nations do this all the time. The Chinese are similarly buying insurance in Central Asia - where American involvement has gone up since 9/11 - by promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

It is instructive that the most fervid votaries of the Quadrilateral are not the Americans, contrary to popular belief, but the Japanese. Tokyo is investing strategically in Indian infrastructure and manufacture and clearly seeking an Asian architecture that is not perilously tilted in favour of China.

Washington and Canberra are, on the other hand, wary of pushing the idea too quickly, extremely sensitive to Beijing's concerns. Substantial American capital is invested in China and, in the case of Australia, the big market for that country's commodities - its primary source of income - are the factories on China's eastern sea-board.

There is a lesson here for India, but perhaps not one Mr Karat and his friends would want to consider. India has to give the US and the West enough of a stake in its economic development. This would render Governments in those countries more amenable to persuasion or - if you prefer a harsher expression - soft blackmail.

For instance, if American, French and Japanese companies are helping build a dozen nuclear energy plants in India, servicing contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, then those countries may be willing to "understand" a hypothetical Indian re-interpretation of some provisions of the 123 and similar Agreements.

The third round of bogeyman sloganeering is devoted to domestic politics rather than foreign policy. Consider the political time-table. The UPA Government is close to the end of its effective term. In six months it will present its final Budget and a long election season will begin.

The CPI(M) has got all it could from the UPA arrangement. One of its MPs was elected Lok Sabha Speaker. It easily won Assembly elections in Kerala and West Bengal without its support for the Congress at the Centre being an embarrassment. The Left masterminded a witch-hunt in educational and cultural institutions in the name of "detoxification". It vetoed "politically incorrect" presidential candidates and installed a fellow traveller intellectual in the vice-presidency.

Now the Communists have one final item on the agenda. They have to grab the Opposition space in the coming 12 to 18 months and pretend they are not responsible for the 'sins' of the UPA Government. These are the sort of principles usually exhibited by the cad who seduces a lady and then pretends he's not the father of her child.

In the case of the UPA, Comrade Karat obviously sees advantage in converting "proximity to America" into a faultline. The problem is his party may not quite want to bring down the Government so much earlier than the summer 2009 national election. It is enjoying its influence in Delhi. Further, there is no certainty the Left Front will repeat its 2004 performance and enter the next Lok Sabha with a 61-seat bonanza.

So what will the Left want to do? It will seek to completely neuter the Congress by targeting the Prime Minister, painting him as an American agent and asking for his removal. A perusal of Left criticism of Mr Manmohan Singh in the early-1990s, when he was Finance Minister, would be educative. The late Nikhil Chakravartty wrote an article in The Telegraph referring to him as a traitor and a "quisling".

Even if the Congress doesn't give in and refuses to change its Prime Minister - it would be politically suicidal to surrender to Left bullying - there are enough old fogeys in Mr Manmohan Singh's party who may see their chance and attack him.

The Communists have retreated somewhat over the weekend but they are waiting to hit back. The Prime Minister's proposed visit to President George W Bush's ranch in September and the resultant photo-ops may be the moment for the next attack, a personalised assault rather than a broad-sweep foreign policy criticism. The battle will be renewed - between India that is Bharat, and India that is Karat.
 
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